What Happens In The Pacific Does Not Stay In The Pacific
Rising food prices, strained farms, and the question of what comes next in 2027.
As a child, I rode with my father on his Massey Ferguson 135.
Robert Dobie Langenkamp drove it shirtless in the Oklahoma heat. Later, my sister Heather and I were allowed to drive it ourselves.
The wind seemed always to be blowing.
Dad was a successful lawyer in Tulsa who also worked with my uncle Dave Dobie in the oil industry. He served in President Carter’s administration as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oil and Gas in the Department of Energy. He developed a strong interest in land and cattle. The family had owned land beneath what is now Tulsa International Airport.
He invested in ranch land in the 1970s, after the stock market boom of the late sixties had ended. Roger Lowenstein’s Buffett: The Making of an American Capitalist brings that earlier investment world to mind. Dad was no Warren Buffett. But his attraction to something useful and tangible made sense to me, even if, as I sometimes joke, he was a few decades early.
He bought land near Inola and later near Colcord, in northeastern Oklahoma, not far from the northwestern Arkansas region around Bentonville. Law remained his main occupation. He was more than a hobby rancher, though not by much, and the rest of us were enlisted on weekends.
At local cattle auctions we bought Herefords and a bull named Brutus. My uncle Donald Hohmann, a Tulsa veterinarian, came to help vaccinate the cattle. He stood six feet five and was the kindest uncle I had.
Dad told Lucy, my younger sister, that he had learned much of what he knew about raising cattle from a book published by Oklahoma State University. He also learned by watching other people.
I have worked around cattle and spent weekends on a ranch, but I have never depended on ranching for a living.
A sale I still think about
By the time his health began to fail, Dad had two ranches. At Colcord he had built a herd of just over a hundred cows, raising Black Angus from registered stock. He also had a Brangus bull—an Angus–Brahman cross. Brahman ancestry helps cattle tolerate heat. We had to be careful around this bull.
Failing health meant Dad had to sell the herd. We talked about the sale before he died. I remember a price of about $1.80 a pound, though I am not sure of the weight basis or exactly which animals that figure covered. I would need the sale records before comparing it with prices today. A price for live cattle is not a retail price for beef, but some lightweight steer calves now sell for more than $5.00 a pound on a liveweight basis.1 Those calf prices do not tell us what Dad’s herd would be worth today.
Since his death, I have returned to that conversation more than once. I suspect many of us keep talking to the dead, conducting an imperfect sort of telepathy in which we must supply both sides.
Dad, if you could see the price of beef now, would you be kicking yourself for selling—or telling us you had always said cattle and land were a good investment?
Of course, he had not sold because he was wrong about the market. The ranch had always broken even, but only just. This was around 2012. His health required the sale. An investment can outlast the investor’s ability to manage it. Farmers and ranchers can find themselves in this position: there may be no one available to help manage the farm or ranch.
Recent farm auctions and a video about El Niño made me wonder how severe weather, strained farm finances, and disrupted trade might affect food prices that were already rising. Reports of large speculative positions in agricultural markets added another reason to look closely.
Could commodity prices spike in 2027? Should investment in the farm economy have a larger place in a diversified portfolio?
Prices have already moved
Several food commodities have already become more expensive.
The FAO Food Price Index for August 2026, released in September, rose 1.9 percent from July and stood 2.5 percent above its level a year earlier. International wheat prices rose 2.6 percent during August and were 15 percent higher than a year earlier. The sugar index jumped 11.9 percent in the month.
These figures measure changes in international commodity prices over different periods. They do not measure supermarket inflation or investment returns.
The increases follow earlier declines in some markets. The overall food index remained 16.8 percent below its March 2022 peak. Dairy prices rose during August but were still substantially below their year-earlier level. Even within a rising category, individual products and producing regions moved differently.
Each commodity has its own supply and demand conditions. Before investing, I would want to know how much the current price already reflects the expected shortage.
Farm closures and production
At a retirement auction, a farmer sells machinery accumulated over years of work.
Yet the land may continue producing under a neighboring farmer or a new owner. Fewer farm businesses need not mean fewer acres planted or a smaller harvest. Consolidation can preserve output even while changing the character of rural life.
Financial distress can eventually reduce production: farmers may cut fertilizer use, postpone maintenance, lose access to operating credit, or leave land unplanted. A sale notice alone does not tell us whether any of these cuts have occurred.
The distress among farmers deserves attention in its own right. For example, a 2023 study of male farmers in participating US states found an estimated 2.4 percent annual increase in suicide rates over 2003–2017. The study does not establish whether that trend has continued.
Bankruptcy filings provide a separate measure of financial distress. The National Agricultural Law Center’s DEBT project records the following agricultural Chapter 11 and Chapter 12 cases in the first half of each year, using the same dataset throughout.2
| Period | Bankruptcy cases | Change from the preceding first half |
|---|---|---|
| January–June 2024 | 121 | — |
| January–June 2025 | 196 | +62.0% |
| January–June 2026 | 208 | +6.1% |
First-half filings in 2026 were 71.9 percent above those in 2024, although the rate of increase slowed sharply in the latest year. Doubling the 2026 first-half count gives 416 cases, compared with 340 recorded in all of 2025—an increase of 22.4 percent. That is a straight-line annualized estimate, not a forecast adjusted for seasonality. The comparison also reflects the lower count in the second half of 2025: 144 cases, against 196 in the first half.
These are bankruptcy cases, not a count of individual farms closing or equipment being liquidated. Related businesses within one agricultural operation can file separate cases, and bankruptcy can allow an operation to reorganize and continue farming. These figures do not establish a connection between bankruptcy filings and the suicide trend described above.
The USDA’s September farm-income forecast projects US crop receipts rising 6.1 percent in 2026 while total farm production expenses rise 4.5 percent. Overall net farm income is forecast to fall 2.6 percent in nominal terms, with considerable differences among agricultural sectors.
Higher receipts do not ensure higher profits. If costs leave farmers unable to finance planting and harvesting, production may fall.
Used-equipment prices
Some machines still attract firm bids at the auctions we follow. I have also had the impression that equipment and supplies used in livestock farming have held up better than some machinery used to grow crops. Perhaps part of that impression reflects which sales have caught my attention.
There is some broader support for stabilization. A September 17 report from Sandhills Global, covering August, reported modest increases in auction values and declining equipment inventories. Its findings cover the markets it tracks.
At the September 26 MacFadden auction in Sharon Springs, New York, we recorded several sales. Reported sale prices included $49,000 for a John Deere 5075E advertised with 157 hours and a loader package, $26,000 for a Kubota L3560 with 501 hours, cab and loader, and $165,000 for a 2023 John Deere 6R 215 advertised with 253 hours. Our notes do not establish the additional fees or the buyers’ total costs. I distinguish tractors with more than 100 engine horsepower from smaller machines. Of these three, only the John Deere 6R 215 belongs in that larger category. Prices need to be compared within each category.
To judge whether prices have stabilized, we need earlier sales of machines with similar age, hours, condition, attachments, and location. Differences in the equipment offered can otherwise distort the comparison.
I want to know whether used-equipment prices are stabilizing and whether corn and soybean growers are confident enough to replace machinery or expand acreage. Several months of comparable sales would help answer those questions.
Competition from Brazil
Brazil’s growing output has increased competition for American corn and soybean growers. A USDA review published in 2022 described agricultural output doubling over 2000–20. Brazilian soybean exports, only 40 percent of US exports in 2000, had overtaken them by the time of that review.
Agricultural research, notably through Embrapa, helped adapt crops to tropical conditions. Cultivation spread into the Cerrado, yields improved, and farmers could follow soybeans with a second crop of corn. Strong Chinese demand supported soybean exports. Better transport made it easier to get them to port.
USDA researchers found that Brazilian soybean production costs per acre averaged 22.5 percent below US costs over 2010/11–2021/22, largely because of lower land and capital costs. They also found that Brazil’s average inland transport cost per metric ton fell 21.4 percent between the periods 2008/09–2012/13 and 2017/18–2021/22. Those are historical cost comparisons, not today’s export quotations, but they help explain the competitive shift.
More exportable soybeans, supplied competitively, put downward pressure on world prices relative to what they would otherwise be. American growers must compete for buyers who can turn to Brazil. That pressure can reach the price offered at an American grain elevator, even when the local farmer’s costs have not fallen. Exchange rates, freight, tariffs, and demand from China affect which origin is cheapest for a particular shipment; Brazilian beans are not always cheaper.
For corn and beans, the question is whether the expected selling price will cover the next season’s costs. A February 2026 comparison of representative farms in Iowa and Mato Grosso found soybean losses on the Iowa farm in 2024 while the Brazilian farm remained profitable. These were two representative operations, not national averages. They illustrate how the same market can support profitable production in one region and losses in another.
The USDA soybean outlook available in September 2026 raised its 2026/27 US season-average price forecast to $12 a bushel. That is a forecast, not a local cash bid or a guarantee of profit. Brazil’s expansion remains a competitive pressure even when prices recover.
Another strong Brazilian harvest in 2027 could limit price increases and keep American margins tight. A serious Brazilian shortfall would reduce supplies available to buyers, including China, and could raise world prices.
Livestock income and equipment demand
My impression of strength around beef, lamb, and goats suggests another possibility. Better livestock returns could support demand for hay equipment, feeders, fencing, handling equipment, and trailers even while crop growers defer large machinery purchases.
There is evidence for part of this argument. USDA’s September forecast expects US cattle and calf receipts to rise 5.2 percent in 2026 as cattle prices continue to increase. FAO reported firmer international sheep-meat prices in August, but falling international bovine-meat quotations. Different markets can move in opposite directions. Neither report establishes a broad rise in goat prices or proves that livestock-equipment prices are strengthening.
For now, the livestock-equipment connection is a hypothesis drawn from observation, not a measured national trend. I’d want to see actual sales of livestock and hay equipment held up against crop machinery over several months before trusting it.
Higher livestock prices also raise costs for buyers. A breeder selling calves, a feedlot buying them, and a farmer buying breeding stock face different costs. Expensive animals can raise one operator’s income and another’s working-capital needs. Higher grain prices can squeeze feeding margins. A smaller herd can command higher prices while requiring less equipment and feed in total.
We need to establish which producers have money to invest and what they are buying.
Why ranchers may not expand
High cattle prices can make expansion worth considering, but drought may make it impractical. A ranch needs enough grass and water to support more animals. Buying feed can keep cattle alive through a dry period, but it raises costs and leaves the owner exposed if the drought continues. USDA’s account of the cattle cycle describes how poor pasture and forage conditions can force herd reductions and delay rebuilding. Keeping a young female for breeding also means giving up a sale today and paying to raise her before her first calf can be sold. That commitment takes years to produce a return.
Some ranchers do not want to take on more risk. In Morning Brew’s September 24 report on the beef industry, the rancher and banker interviewed describe older owners for whom high cattle prices offer an opportunity to retire. After years of difficult returns, selling may be more attractive than borrowing to expand, particularly if no one in the family wants to take over. Those interviews do not tell us how many ranchers will leave, but they describe a decision I recognize from Dad’s experience. The ability and willingness to keep doing the work matter as much as the selling price.
The industry into which ranchers sell has also changed. A 2024 USDA review of meatpacking reports that the four largest beef packers account for 85 percent of steer and heifer purchases, compared with 36 percent in 1980. Concentration at the processing stage affects the choices available to cattle feeders and, through them, the market for ranchers’ calves. Where competing plants are few, a closure can leave sellers with fewer buyers and longer journeys to market.
Larger plants have lowered processing costs, and concentration alone does not establish that buyers are suppressing cattle prices. USDA’s review nevertheless finds that high concentration combined with limited processing capacity can weaken competition. A rancher considering expansion must weigh access to buyers as well as future demand for beef.
Brazilian beef adds another competitive pressure. Brazil already supplies beef to the United States; the risk for American ranchers is that additional imports could restrain the prices they receive and reduce the expected return from rebuilding their herds. Imported beef can reach buyers sooner than a rancher can raise another generation of cattle. USDA explains that much imported beef consists of lean trimmings blended with fattier domestic beef for ground meat. Imports therefore both compete with domestic production and complement it. They can ease shortages for consumers without giving American ranchers a stronger reason to expand.
Two of the four dominant U.S. beef packers are Brazilian-controlled: JBS USA and National Beef. JBS belongs to the group controlled by Brazil’s Batista family; National Beef is majority-owned through Marfrig, now part of MBRF following its merger with BRF. Reporting on the industry’s ownership and National Beef’s acquisition announcement, together with MBRF’s company history, trace those connections. These groups have businesses in both American cattle processing and Brazilian beef production. Their opportunities are broader than those of a rancher dependent on local land, weather, and cattle buyers. Brazilian control does not mean the cattle processed in their U.S. plants were raised in Brazil, but it means that two major buyers of American cattle also belong to groups producing competing beef abroad.
Higher prices therefore need not bring a quick increase in production. Drought can limit the herd a ranch can support; an owner may prefer retirement to another financial commitment; fewer competing processors can make market access less attractive; and additional imports can limit the price increases that might otherwise encourage expansion. Further heat and drought could compound those constraints even while cattle prices remain high.
Heat, drought, and the soil
Dad valued land because it could support animals and produce food. Keeping it productive requires care of the soil and water supply.
The Dust Bowl showed how severely farmland could be damaged. Across Oklahoma, Kansas, Texas, and other parts of the Great Plains, drought and extraordinary summer heat struck land already made vulnerable by the removal of native grass and extensive cultivation. Crops failed, exposed soil blew away, and farms lost more than one season’s income.
Heat helped turn the drought into an agricultural catastrophe. A study of the extraordinary heat of the 1930s found that spring rainfall deficits and land-surface feedbacks helped intensify the summer heat. Dry soil provides less evaporative cooling; hotter conditions, in turn, increase the demand for water. Heat and drought reinforced one another on land already left exposed by cultivation.
Our ranches in northeastern Oklahoma were not in the Dust Bowl’s hardest-hit southern High Plains. The conditions today differ, but that history gives us reason to take the effects of exceptional heat on agriculture seriously.
This is one reason I enjoy Patrick Shivers’ farming videos. A farmer in south Georgia, he shows machinery, field work, and trials, including comparisons of tilled and no-till ground. I appreciate seeing the decisions and work behind the finished crop. The suitability of no-till varies by farm. Soil and moisture retention affect the long-term value of the land.
The heat forecast for 2027
The New Scientist discussion I watched on YouTube led me to the underlying forecasts. In August, the BBC reported the UK Met Office’s assessment that the developing El Niño, added to human-caused warming, makes 2027 “very likely” to be the hottest year on record globally.
The World Meteorological Organization’s May outlook, drawing on predictions from 13 institutes, put the chance of a new annual temperature record somewhere in 2026–2030 at 86 percent. Its lead author identified 2027 as a candidate because of the expected El Niño. The 86 percent estimate covers the full five-year period; the Met Office’s assessment is specific to 2027.
The Climate Impact Lab’s September report, 451,000 at Risk, projects about 451,000 additional heat-related deaths worldwide over June 2026–February 2027, compared with the corresponding months of an average year in 1996–2025. Within that total, its forward-looking estimate for September 2026–February 2027 is 239,000, with a reported uncertainty range of ±11,000. These are modeled estimates of excess deaths. Measures to protect people from heat can reduce the toll.
The video describes the figure as a Southern Hemisphere projection. The original report does not: it is global, with the greatest burdens concentrated in the Global South, which is not the same geographical category. Its method combines European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts temperature projections with estimates of temperature-related mortality across 24,378 regions. The report says full details of the seasonal method will be published in a forthcoming peer-reviewed journal. Nor is this an estimate of deaths from famine or a forecast of crop yields; those require their own evidence.
A 2017 synthesis of four independent methods found that rising temperatures reduce average global yields of wheat, rice, maize, and soybeans, although effects differ by crop and region. Its estimates exclude the benefits of carbon-dioxide fertilization, effective adaptation, and genetic improvement. They are not percentages we can simply apply to next year’s harvest. The study nevertheless supports the expectation of yield losses from excessive heat.
I expect an exceptionally hot 2027 to damage crops in several producing regions. Farmers, food buyers, and governments should prepare for heat-related losses. What remains uncertain is their location and scale, how much good harvests elsewhere can offset them, and whether they become a sustained global shortage. A harvest can also grow because more land is planted while still yielding less than it would have without the heat.
Crop risks in Brazil and Mexico
Brazil’s role as a major soybean supplier to China makes its growing conditions especially important. Much of the soybean crop is grown in the Cerrado and other regions outside the Amazon basin. Rainfall and heat there during planting, flowering, and crop development will affect the harvest. Disruption of the soybean calendar can also affect the second corn crop planted after it. We should watch those crop regions and planting windows rather than assume that drought or flooding will strike the whole country in the same way.
Mexico supplies much of the fruit and vegetables sold in the United States. A USDA study published in September 2025 found that US horticultural imports from Mexico grew from an annual average of $7.3 billion in 2007–09 to $19.7 billion in 2021–23, measured in constant 2023 dollars. Tomatoes, peppers, avocados, berries, and other produce connect Mexican growing conditions directly to American food supplies.
Irrigation and protected cultivation can reduce crop losses, provided growers have enough water. The World Bank’s account of drought in Latin America identifies threats to drinking and irrigation supplies in Mexico and other countries, with drought risk expected to intensify in already dry areas. For Mexico, the questions are reservoir and groundwater availability, irrigation allocations, and heat during sensitive crop stages. This is a documented vulnerability, not a verified forecast that every Mexican growing region will suffer drought in 2027.
North Africa: exporting fruit, importing grain
Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt export important food crops while also relying on imported staples. A country can lose agricultural export earnings just when it needs more money to import food.
Morocco supplies fruit, including berries and citrus, to overseas markets. A USDA review identified Europe as the principal destination in 2021. The World Bank has documented drought vulnerability in its citrus, olive, and cereal sectors. Recent conditions have improved. FAO’s July 2026 assessment forecast cereal production 16 percent above the five-year average after abundant rain restored soil moisture and reservoirs.
Tunisia is an important olive-oil exporter to Europe and the United States. USDA’s 2025 assessment describes irrigation expansion intended to stabilize olive output during drought years. Drought can reduce olive yields despite the trees’ tolerance of dry conditions. Rainfall and available irrigation matter, and the trees’ alternating high- and low-production cycle means a smaller crop cannot automatically be attributed to heat.
Egypt has already reported heat damage to its orange crop. USDA’s December 2025 citrus report identifies it as the world’s leading orange exporter. The report reduced its previous 2024/25 production estimate by 5.4 percent because prolonged high temperatures at the beginning of fruit set had hurt production. That was a revision to an estimate, not a measured 5.4 percent year-on-year fall. The same report forecast a recovery for 2025/26 as conditions improved.
These examples strengthen the case for expecting agricultural disruption if the heat outlook materializes. They do not establish one common El Niño rainfall forecast for all of North Africa. We need to follow each crop’s calendar and water supply. Export losses in fruit or olive oil would also be different from the wheat, corn, and soybean reserve decline tested in our filed Oracle Bone.
A disappointing harvest matters more when inventories are thin. People cannot stop eating, and farmers cannot produce an extra harvest on demand. If heat and water stress damage several suppliers at once, the resulting squeeze can cause prices to rise much more than the percentage reduction in available supply. This could cause a commodity-price spike, although investment returns would also depend on the price paid and the instrument used.
War, shipping, and fuel costs
Weather is only part of the risk. War can interrupt the supply of grain without destroying the crop.
Russian attacks on Ukraine’s grain infrastructure threaten the ports through which harvests reach foreign buyers. An August 13 report from Al Jazeera described strikes on grain infrastructure in the Odesa region, alongside Ukrainian attacks on Russian grain terminals at Novorossiysk. Damage to loading facilities, disrupted sailings, and higher insurance costs can reduce the grain available to importers or raise the cost of delivering it.
The price effects need not be uniform. Grain trapped behind a damaged export route can fetch less at the farm while costing more at its destination. Farmers may therefore receive little benefit from higher world prices.
Ukraine’s strikes on Russian oil refineries create a second pressure. CNBC reported on September 14 that the attacks had disrupted refining and that Russia had extended restrictions on diesel exports. Reduced supplies of refined fuel can tighten diesel markets even when crude oil remains available. The report also identified Middle Eastern supply disruptions and rising crude prices: the refinery attacks contribute to the pressure, but do not explain every increase at the pump.
Tractors run on diesel. So do many combines, irrigation pumps, and the trucks that carry seed, fertilizer, animals, and harvested crops. More expensive diesel raises the cost of producing food and moving it. It does not guarantee that farmers can charge enough to recover the increase. Some may instead face narrower margins or reduce spending on the next crop.
Poor harvests, damaged export routes, and expensive fuel could reinforce one another. Repairs, restored shipping, or an easing of conflict could relieve the pressure. I want to track export volumes, refinery output, and delivered fuel costs to assess these effects.
Speculative positions
Saxo’s September commentary on trader positioning described agricultural speculative positions as historically elevated, even as some profits were being taken. The reported positioning suggests that many speculators already expect prices to rise.
Positions are also not the same as fresh dollars flowing into a market. A change in a net position can reflect new buying, the closing of bets against prices, or both.
Further buying could raise prices. If the expected shortages fail to occur, widespread selling could cause a sharp decline.
Could prices spike in 2027?
Yes. The question is which prices, for how long, and how much of that risk is already reflected in today’s market.
One possibility is a more persistent squeeze. Weather damages crops in several important exporting regions, attacks interrupt grain shipments and fuel supplies, and governments restrict exports to protect domestic supplies. Inventories decline while production and transport costs rise. Demand proves difficult to reduce. In that setting, already rising prices could have further to go.
A second possibility is a patchwork year. I expect damaging heat in multiple producing regions, but some crops will fare better than others and strong harvests elsewhere may offset part of the losses. Prices could spike around particular shortages without producing a general agricultural boom. This remains a more useful starting assumption than expecting every commodity to rise together.
A third possibility is that markets have overestimated the shortage. Weather proves less damaging than feared, damaged facilities return to service, and shipping disruptions ease. Farmers respond to higher prices with additional planting. Buyers economize or substitute. Speculative positions unwind, and prices fall despite continuing hardship in parts of the farming economy.
These are scenarios, not assigned probabilities. Nor is a brief price spike the same as a high annual average. A prediction about 2027 should say which outcome it means before claiming success afterward.
Ways to invest in agriculture
Agricultural investments differ in their sources of income and their risks.
A commodity fund offers exposure to a basket or an individual crop, commonly through futures contracts. It does not necessarily deliver the return implied by a headline about spot prices: fees and the cost of replacing expiring contracts matter.
Shares in agricultural companies depend on those companies’ profits. Fertilizer producers depend on their own selling prices and input costs. Equipment makers need customers willing and able to buy machinery. High food prices do not automatically make either a good investment.
Farmland is different again. Its economics involve purchase price, rent, soil, water, financing, and the ability of a tenant or operator to earn a living. A drought can make grain more valuable while making a particular farm less profitable.
An equipment recovery and a commodity-price spike are also different investment cases. Used machines might hold their value because fewer are offered for sale or because new replacements are expensive. Neither explanation requires a food shortage. Conversely, a crop failure might raise grain prices while leaving affected farmers unable to buy machinery.
What I want to watch
I have asked Thea, my AI assistant, to help me track crop prospects, stocks, farm costs, Black Sea exports, diesel prices, and trader positioning week to week. Alongside those measures, I want to compare equipment sale results by category. We will use these observations to assess whether supplies are tightening.
The investment hypothesis deserves more careful study. It would strengthen if exportable stocks fell, crop forecasts worsened across several suppliers, and demand held up. It would weaken if harvests replenished stocks or buyers cut consumption. Equipment stabilization would be a separate finding, useful for assessing farm spending but insufficient to predict grain prices.
Before taking a position, I would want to name the commodity, the expected catalyst, the holding period, and the loss I could accept. I would also want to explain why the investment remains attractive after the price increases already recorded.
The heat outlook leads me to expect crop damage in several regions. Whether those losses cause a sustained global shortage or profitable investment opportunities remains uncertain.
Total farm output can remain high while individual farmers struggle financially. Farmers should be able to earn a living, and households should be able to afford food. Those concerns should inform how we invest in agriculture.
Agricultural investments may help diversify a portfolio, depending on the assets chosen and their relationship to the investor’s other holdings.
There is also a distinction between investing in agricultural prices and helping agriculture. Buying a futures-based fund does not directly finance a farmer’s next crop. Providing capital for a viable farm business, equipment, or sound stewardship of land is a different undertaking, with its own risks and obligations.
Dad valued owning productive land. His experience also taught me that health and family circumstances can force a sale, whatever the market is doing.
If I could ask him about today’s prices, I would. He would probably tell me not to bother predicting them—any more than the price of oil. His years in government and in the oil business with my uncle Dave gave him plenty of experience with forecasts that proved wrong. My grandfather wrote the original Langenkamp oilfield terminology dictionary. Oil was part of our family’s working life. In his absence, I will keep learning from farmers, ranchers, and others who work in these markets.
Written with assistance from Thea, my AI assistant. Originally written September 27, 2026; revised with additional research September 28, 2026. This is an exploration of possible outcomes, not a recommendation to buy a particular investment.
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USDA Agricultural Marketing Service and Texas Department of Agriculture, Texas Weekly Cattle Auction Summary, September 25, 2026, p. 1, “Steers—Medium and Large 1 (Per Cwt / Actual Wt).” Steers weighing 310–340 lb sold for $485–$545 per hundredweight ($4.85–$5.45/lb), with a weighted average of $514.11/cwt ($5.14/lb). By contrast, the 500–545 lb group averaged $397.72/cwt ($3.98/lb). These are feeder-steer prices, not a valuation of mature breeding cows or an entire herd. USDA report. The linked report is updated regularly; figures cited are from the September 25 edition. ↩
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National Agricultural Law Center, in partnership with the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture, Data on Economic and Bankruptcy Trends (DEBT), June 2026 PACER docket snapshot; accessed September 28, 2026. Counts combine agricultural Chapter 11 and Chapter 12 cases; percentage changes and the annualized estimate are our calculations. The project counts distinct court-and-case-number combinations, not unique farms. Chapter 11 coverage is limited to debtors matched by name and address to historical Farm Service Agency payment records; Chapter 12 includes all identified cases. Chapters reflect their status at the June 2026 data pull, which can differ from the chapter at filing. This series should not be mixed with Chapter 12-only statistics. ↩